Source:
https://www.sec-consult.com/files/20110407-0_libmodplug_stackoverflow.txt
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20110407-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Libmodplug ReadS3M Stack Overflow
product: Libmodplug library
vulnerable version: 0.8.8.1
fixed version: 0.8.8.2
impact: critical
homepage: http://modplug-xmms.sourceforge.net/
found: 2011-03-09
by: M. Lucinskij, P. Tumenas / SEC Consult
Vulnerability Lab https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
Most users will probably be getting libmodplug from a downstream
source, such as their linux distribution, or video/audio player. Some
of these downstream video/audio players which use libmodplug include:
UModPlayer - http://umodplayer.sourceforge.net/
VideoLAN Client - http://videolan.org/
PyModPlug -
http://www.sacredchao.net/~piman/software/python.shtml#modplug
Gstreamer Linux Users: libmodplug and ModPlug-XMMS are in most Linux
distributions. Debian, Fedora, Ubuntu, Gentoo are all known to have
these are standard packages
http://modplug-xmms.sourceforge.net/#whatis
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
Libmodplug library is prone to a stack based buffer overflow
vulnerability due to insufficient validation of user supplied data. An
attacker is able to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user
when opening malicious S3M media files.
Vulnerability exists in ReadS3M method, vulnerable code is located in
load_s3m.cpp (excerpt):
WORD ptr[256];
...
memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(ptr));
if (nins+npat)
{
memcpy(ptr, lpStream+dwMemPos, 2*(nins+npat));
variables nins and npat are controlled by user and are read from
supplied file without any validation. These parameters directly
influence the amount of data to be copied, this can be used to overflow
the stack with user controlled data.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
Nins and npat as defined by the S3M specification
(http://hackipedia.org/File%20formats/Music/html/s3mformat.php) are a
number of instruments and a number of patterns used in the file, they
reside at 0x22 and 0x24 offsets from the beginning of the file
respectively.
Debugger output:
0:008> r
eax=00003333 ebx=00003333 ecx=00001999 edx=ffffffff esi=000000a8
edi=00006666
eip=6f88c316 esp=0469f090 ebp=0469fa88 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na
pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b
efl=00010206
libmod_plugin!vlc_entry__1_1_0g+0x1b106:
6f88c316 8b9a10e90000 mov ebx,dword ptr [edx+0E910h]
ds:002b:0000e90f=????????
If we check the SEH chain:
0:008> !exchain
0469ff70: ffffffff
Invalid exception stack at ffffffff
We can see that the exception handler chain is invalid as stack has been
overwritten. And if we try to continue the execution, it jumps to
0xfffffff, which is a value that we can control.
0:008> g
Thu Mar 10 16:00:41.199 2011 (GMT+2): (8244.7dc0): Access violation -
code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=ffffffff edx=7785894d esi=00000000
edi=00000000
eip=ffffffff esp=0469ec8c ebp=0469ecac iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na
pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b
efl=00010246
ffffffff ?? ???
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The vulnerability is verified to exist in v0.8.8.1 of libmodplug, which
is the most recent version at the time of discovery.
Older versions are probably affected as well.
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2011-03-25: Contacting vendor through email
2011-04-02: Patched version released
2011-04-07: Public release
Solution:
---------
Update to version 0.8.8.2
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/advisories.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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EOF M.Lucinskij, P.Tumenas / @2011
